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TORTS-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*

The number of torts cases was somewhat less this year than in past
years, being below the forty figure rather than above it. There were
no particularly significant legal developments in the field. Perhaps
the cases indicate, however, a developing fashion in automobile negligence actions. At least four of the cases seem to have been brought
for whiplash injuries.'
NEGLIGENCE

Breach of Duty
The question of whether the defendant has been negligent-has
breached his duty to use due care-is normally treated as a question
of fact, and it is usually submitted to the jury in terms of "what a
person of reasonable prudence would have done under the same or
similar circumstances. '2 Sometimes the defendant is identified somewhat more precisely. Two statements in cases decided during the
survey period are relevant in this connection. "[A] notary is held to
the care and diligence of a reasonable prudent man to ascertain the
acknowledger's identity .... -M "[A] retail dealer . . . must exercise
the care and competence of a reasonable dealer as to any defects
which he has an opportunity to discover; the care required of such a
seller at retail is only that of a reasonable man under the circumstances .... -4
In applying the test of what a reasonable man would do, it is proper
for the court to admit and the jury to consider evidence of a custom
in the trade or the vicinity. This was the holding in City Specialty
Store v. Bonner5 where the question was whether the floor of a store
was waxed negligently. The court explained that the "customary
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. The Kroger Co. v. Rawlings, 251 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1958); McCollough
v. Johnson Freight Lines, 308 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1957); Meeks v. Yancey,
311 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957) (three persons and possibly five in-

jured); Williams v. Pritchard, 306 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).
2. See Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wade, 127 Tenn. 154, 158, 153 S.W. 1120,
1121, Am. Ann. Cas. 1914B 1020 (1912). Judge M. M. Neil's opinion in
this case contains a very apt statement of the elements of a negligence case,
including the issue of breach of duty.
3. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Vaughn, 305 S.W.2d 513, 522 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1956), quoting the syllabus in Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193
S.W. 117 (1917).
4. Benson v. Fowler, 306 S.W.2d 49, 57 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957). This was
part of an instruction of the trial court, approved by the court of appeals.
5. 252 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1958).
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practice is not as a matter of law ordinary care .... The customary
'6
way of doing a thing may be a negligent way."
The presence of an emergency is one of the circumstances to be
taken into consideration in determining whether the actor's conduct
was reasonable, and he is not necessarily negligent "because by reason
of the impending danger his judgment is confused and he fails to make
the most judicious choice .... "7 The foreseeability of danger to third
parties is also an important factor in determining negligence.8
The general standard of care is sometimes held to be reduced to a
specific rule of conduct when the legislature has passed a criminal
statute covering the matter. This is known as the doctrine of negligence per se. The doctrine was raised in two cases but the statutes
were held to be inapplicable.9
Proof of breach of duty is normally by specific testimony as to what
the actor did. Sometimes circumstanitial evidence is utilized. Thus,
in City Specialty Stores v. Bonner 0 the fact that two other customers
had slipped and fallen on the same day that the plaintiff fell "was
competent to show not only notice of the slippery condition of the
floor, but also to show its dangerous condition."'" Some forms of circumstantial evidence are dignified by the term res ipsa loquitur. In
the two cases where this doctrine was raised, it was held to be
inapplicable.' 2
The survey period has produced the usual number of cases stating
that the issue of whether the defendant was negligent (breached his
duty of care) is for the jury to decide,13 but there are also the usual
6. Id. at 503.
7. Young v. Franklin Interurban Co., 306 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1957), quoting the syllabus in Chattanooga Elec. Ry. v. Cooper, 109 Tenn.
308, 70 S.W. 72 (1902) (contributory negligence).
8. In Friendship Tel. Co. v. Russom, 309 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957)
the court distinguishes foreseeability of danger to somebody in determining
negligence from foreseeability of the particular injury in determining proximate cause.
9. Hill v. Harrill, 310 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1957) (statute requiring special
plates for dealers not applicable when bailee injures someone); Minton v.
Gobble, 304 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957) (school-zone and residentialarea speed statutes).
10. 252 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1958).
11. Id. at 503.
12. City of Maryville v. Farmer, 244 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1957) (electric
utility not in exclusive control when electrocution took place inside a plant
and utility was not responsible for internal wiring); Schenk v. Gwaltney, 309
S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957) (Indiana automobile guest statute required proof of "wanton or wilful conduct").
13. E.g., City Specialty Stores, Inc. v. Bonner, 252 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1958)
(verdict sustained); Beene v. Cook, 311 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957)
(verdict sustained); Benson v. Fowler, 306 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957)
(jury verdict sustained); Sternheim v. Andrew Jackson Hotel Operating Co.,
305 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957) (negligence and contributory negligence--directed verdict improper).
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decisions that the court must make the determination when only one
reasonable conclusion can be reached from the evidence. 14
Causation
A negligence case requires a cause-in-fact relationship between
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's damage. Thus in two cases
involving negligence of a notary public in taking an acknowledgment,
it was held that the negligence had no factual connection with plaintiff's loss. 15

In Meeks v. Yancey 6 three persons in a car had received whiplash
injuries. Each had a pre-existing condition (arthritis or degeneration
of neck or cervical spine) which was aggravated by the accident. In
the court below the judge had instructed that recovery should be
confined "to the extent or amount that said injury aggravated or
,caused the pre-existing injury, disease or ailment to become worse.
In other words, the law compensates for the extent an old injury or
deceased condition was aggravated or rendered worse by said injury
negligently aggravated."' 1 This was held to be error. If the preexisting condition was not causing pain or suffering or disability and
after the collision it did cause pain and suffering and disability, the
court indicated, the collision is the proximate cause of the injuries. 8
To illustrate its position it put the case of a plaintiff who had a diseased condition in the bone of his leg so that it broke from a light blow
which was negligently inflicted by the defendant and which would
not have broken a normal leg; the diseased condition of the leg prevented its healing so that it was amputated. The court says that
defendant would be liable for the loss of the leg, for pain and suffering
resulting therefrom and for all medical expenses, and adds that
defendant would "be entitled to no reduction in damages ...because

of the fact that the plaintiff lost a badly diseased leg as distinguished
from a healthy or normal leg."' 9 The statement is clearly correct
insofar as the loss of the leg and the pain and suffering from the ampu14. E.g., City of Maryville v. Farmer, 244 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1957) (jury
verdict reversed); Zanola v. Hall, 307 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957)
(directed verdict sustained).
15. In Lowe v. Robin, 310 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tenn. 1958) the court said that
"the proximate cause of the loss in this case must be laid to the Lowes,
who after they had received the money from Parrish, took it to the bank and
had it deposited in their own names, and then turned the money over to
Parrish." In Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Vaughn, 305 S.W.2d 513,
522 (Tenn. 'App. M.S. 1956) the statement was that "it is not shown that
the mere failure to swear him changed or affected the results in so far as
the complaining witnesses are concerned."
16. 311 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
17. Id. at 331.
18. The court relied strongly on the case of Elrod v. Town of Franklin,
140 Tenn. 228, 204 S.W. 298 (1917) where there is language to this effect.
19. 311 S.W.2d at 336.
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tation and the medical expenses are concerned, but the last part
of it (that in quotation marks above) at least carries a possible
implication which may go too far. Suppose that the diseased condition
of the leg had already progressed to the point where plaintiff had to
use crutches. Would this not affect the measure of damages for the
loss of use of the leg? After all, where defendant negligently kills a
man, he may always show a diseased condition which affected the
decedent's life expectancy, and this is pertinent to the measure of
damages. In the end the determination should depend upon whether
20
the damage is actually divisible and can be apportioned properly.
In FriendshipTel. Co. v. Russom 2l defendant maintained a telephone
pole on the bank by the side of a road. A guy wire ran from the pole
to an anchor in the road ditch. Plaintiff's decedent, using a road machine to clear out the ditch, struck the buried anchor rod with such
force as to cause the guy wire to break the decayed telephone pole.
It fell on his head and killed him. Assuming negligence in the condition of the pole and the location of the guy wire and anchor, there
was clearly a cause-in-fact relationship. Defendant appealed from
an adverse jury verdict, claiming that there was no proximate cause
because of the unusual character of the accident, which was not foreseeable.
The court made it clear that proximate cause, or legal cause, involves
more than cause in fact, and that liability may be cut off despite the
presence of cause in fact; but it explained that foreseeability of the
accident is not the test. Following a helpful discussion of the authoriities, it summarized:
Under these authorities, it was not necessary that defendant should
have been able to foresee the particular harm that befell deceased. It was
enough that defendant could have reasonably foreseen that some such
harm of like general character might result to him from its negligence,
and that the harm which did result was within the reasonable range
of the risk created by such negligence. Such being the case, the negligence
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury.22
Detailed treatment of the Tennessee authorities on proximate cause
has been presented in previous survey issues and will not be repeated
here.2 It is appropriate, however, to say that the opinion in the
Friendship case contains one of the best recent discussions of the
problem. In speaking of the "reasonable range of the risk" the
20. See PROSSER, TORTS § 45 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 20.3
(1956).
21. 309 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
22. Id. at 421.
23. See Wade, Torts-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1136-37
(1955); id., 1954 Survey, 7 VA=. L. REV. 951, 958 (1954); id., 1953 Survey, 6
VAND. L. REV. 990, 1000-02 (1953). Cf. Comment, 23 TENN. L. REV. 1015 (1955).
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opinion makes it clear that this is a standard and that a court must
exercise sound discretion in rendering a policy decision.
Damages
The question of damages is treated as one of fact and is normally
for the jury to determine. Occasionally, however, the jury decision
may be set aside as being inadequate24 or excessive.2 In "considering
whether a verdict is excessive the court can consider the present
deflated value of the dollar." 26
ContributoryNegligence
The determination of whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is normally a task for the jury,27 though occasionally
the decision is made by the court as a matter of law.28 In the one
case involving the defense of assumption of risk it was held that the
29

decision was for the jury.

Exceptions to the rule that contributory negligence bars recovery
are discussed or raised in several cases. 30 McCullough v. Johnson
FreightLines3 ' involved the unique Tennessee doctrine of remote contributory negligence. "It is a settled rule of law in this State that the
plaintiff's contributory negligence as a remote cause of an accident,
and injuries complained of, will mitigate the damages . . .; and that
remote contributory negligence must be considered in mitigation of
damages as a matter of law; it is not within the discretion of the
24. See, e.g., McCullough v. Johnson Freight Lines, 308 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn.
1957) (damages will be set aside as inadequate when "manifestly insufficient
to compensate plaintiff ... the result of passion, prejudice or unaccountable
caprice").
25. See, e.g., The Kroger Co. v. Rawlings, 251 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1958) (must
be a "showing of bias, passion or corruption on the part of the jury").
26. Id. at 945. The question of damages when a pre-existing injury is aggravated was considered in Meeks v. Yancey, 311 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1957), treated supra under the topic of causation.
27. E.g., City Specialty Stores, Inc. v. Bonner, 252 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1958)
(fall on slick floor); Southern Ry. v. Elliott, 250 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1958)
(parents' failure to look after child); Young v. Franklin Interurban Co., 306
S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957) (escape from flaming bus); Benson v.
Fowler, 306 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957) (use of propane gas); Sternheim
v. Andrew Jackson Hotel Operating Co., 305 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1957) (falling on steps); Minton v. Gobble, 304 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1957) (traffic).
28. E.g., Zanola v. Hall, 307 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957) (traffic),
cf. Cart v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 153 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Tenn. 1957)
(use of electric shovel in strip mining).
29. Urmann v. City of Nashville, 311 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957)
(employee riding in back of truck).
30. In Benson v. Fowler, 306 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957) reference
is made to the rule that contributory negligence does not bar recovery where
defendant's negligence was "gross, wilful or wanton," but the court found it
inapplicable.
31. 308 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1957).
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jury."32 As a result the fact that the damages awarded to the plaintiff were "exceedingly small" was held not to be reversible error,
since the jury must have mitigated them on a finding of plaintiff's
remote contributory negligence. This doctrine is equivalent in many
respects to comparative negligence. The difference is that mitigation
of damages there is theoretically on the basis of the degree of negligence of the parties while here the mitigation theoretically depends
upon the relative closeness of the causal relation. Is it likely that
juries make a distinction? A special verdict in cases like the instant
one would be most helpful to the court in understanding what the
jury meant. 33
The doctrine of last clear chance was presented in Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Rochelle34 where the deceased crossed railroad tracks
at a grade crossing with a steep upgrade and might have been found
to be "within striking distance of the train when the train was a
substantial distance down the track and [when] the crew was not on
the lookout to observe decedent's position. '35 This is a broadened application of last clear chance beyond the more restricted doctrine of
"discovered peril" and may be justified by the Tennessee cases. 36
It would appear that logically the doctrine of last clear chance should
be absorbed by the broader doctrine of remote contributory negligence
and have no independent significance, but there has been no judicial
37
discussion of this issue.
ParticularRelationships
1. Traffic and Transportation-Automobiles: A large number of
cases involved collisions. In some of them the details of the accident
were not given.38 In several cases plaintiff was stopped, usually for
a traffic light, when defendant ran into him from the rear. 39 In one
case one car "suddenly loomed in front" of the other; 40 in another
defendant turned left in front of plaintiff; 41 another involved a rail32. Id. at 392.

33. See Wade, Book Review, 8
which would cover these matters.

VAND. L. REV.

657, 660 (1955) for a statute

34. 252 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1958).
35. Id. at 738.

36. For an earlier discussion, see Wade, Torts-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7

VAND. L. R.v.951, 960-61 (1954).

37. The doctrine of last clear chance is mentioned in Smith v. Burks, 305
S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957), but held to have no application.
38. Cf. Caldwell v. Kelly, 302 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1957); Hill v. Harrill, 310
S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1957); Wilson v. Maury County Board of Education, 302
S.W.2d 502 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957) (school bus).

39. McCullough v. Johnson Freight Lines, 308 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1957);
Meeks v. Yancey, 311 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957); Williams v. Pritchard, 306 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957); cf. The Kroger Co. v. Rawlings,
251 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1958).
40. Zanola v. Hall, 307 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
41. Minton v. Gobble, 304 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
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road-crossing collision.42 Other accidents involved striking a bridge
abutment, 43 parked car running into a building,4 and falling off a
car.45 In Young v. FranklinInterurbanCo.0 a bus caught fire following an explosion and a passenger was injured in escaping.
Same-Railroads: All four cases of actions against railroads involved the Railroad Precautions Statute.47 In two of the cases, the
train ran over a person on the tracks,48 and the question was whether
the railroad had complied with all of the precautions prescribed by
subsection (4) of the statute. The court held in both cases as a matter
of law that the requirements had been met, though in one it declared that a jury question was raised regarding liability for common
law negligence. 49 The other two cases involved crossing accidents.
In Southern Ry. v. Clevenger the provisions of subsection (3) of
the statute, requiring the sounding of a whistle or bell one-fourth
mile from the crossing, were held to apply to a case where the plaintiff suffered injuries when he jumped from a moving truck just before it collided with the train.
In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Rochelle5 ' the court declared that
"by the great preponderance of the testimony herein the train did
not give warning of its approach to the crossing." Instead of referring to subsection (3) of the statute, however, it held that the
jury might properly find for the plaintiff for breach of the common
law duty "to give warning of the approach of its train at its crossings." 52 The court discussed subsection (4), and as to the defendant's
contention that it had complied with the statute after the automobile
appeared on the track as an obstruction, it held that this was a question of fact for the jury.
2. Occupiers of Land: An owner or possessor of land owes a duty
42. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Rochelle, 252 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1958);

cf. Southern Ry. v. Clevenger, 243 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1957).

43. Schenck v. Gwaltney, 309 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
44. Beene v. Cook, 311 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
45. Smith v. Burks, 305 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957) (falling off
fender); Urmann v. City of Nashville, 311 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957)
(falling out of loaded truck bed). The Smith case involved a licensee and
is discussed in more detail in the section on landowner's liability.
46. 306 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1203 (1955).
48. Southern Ry. v. Elliott, 250 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1958) (two-year-old boy);
Page v. Tennessee Central Ry., 305 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956) (intoxicated man lying unconscious).
49. Southern Ry. v. Elliott, 250 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1958). There was testimony regarding the speed of the train and failure to blow the whistle before
reaching an unincorporated town.
50. 243 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1957).
51. 252 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1958).
52. Id. at 736. Why there was no reference to subsection (3) is not clear.
Perhaps the crossing was not marked as required by the statute.
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of due care to an invitee, or business guest, and is liable for damages
caused by breach of the duty. Thus recovery was allowed when a
customer slipped and fell on a slick floor,5 3 and it was held to be a
jury issue whether a hotel was negligent when a guest fell down
certain steps leading from a banquet room and just outside a
swinging door.5 4 A similar duty is owed to the public on the highway
-that is, to use care to keep the premises in condition so that they
will not endanger a person traveling on a public road. "This principle extends to users of the highway 'who stay a few feet from it
inadvertently or in an emergency'

. .

. ; and any obstruction over, un-

der, or so near the highway as to endanger such users comes within
this principle." 55

A lesser duty is owed to a person characterized as a licensee. The
nature of this duty and the basis for classifying persons as invitees
or licensees are treated in Smith v. Burks.56 Defendant's truck, delivering ready-mixed concrete to the plaintiff, turned off the highway
on to a field and immediately mired down. Plaintiff came up, put some
rocks in the soft ground and jumped on the running board of the
truck to assist the driver in driving through the field. The truck
went a little way up a slight rise, but the motor stalled and it rolled
back a few feet to the edge of the highway, where the front end
reared up. Plaintiff fell off, breaking his leg. The lower court directed
a verdict for defendants and the court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the plaintiff was a "mere licensee." He was not an "invitee" because: (1) the "driver did not ask or suggest to the plaintiff that he
ride on his truck,"57 and (2) there was no "implied invitation" since
the plaintiff's purpose of directing the driver where to drive would
have been better served "by staying on the ground rather than riding
on the running board."5
53. City Specialty Stores, Inc. v. Bonner, 252 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1958). Cf.
Myles v. Butler, 304 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1957), where the floor of a store
collapsed; the case turned on an issue of parties defendant.
54. Sternheim v. Andrew Jackson Hotel Operating Co., 305 S.W.2d 249
(Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
55. Friendship Tel. Co. v. Russom, 309 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1957) (guy wire to telephone pole anchored in highway ditch, injuring
operator of road machine).
56. 305 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957), 25 TENN. L. REv. 515 (1958).
57. Id. at 750. The significance of this first reason is not entirely clear.
A social guest in a home or an automobile guest in a private car is normally
classified as a licensee even though he receives an express invitation. On
the other hand an invitation to come into a place of business or into a place
held open to the public will make the recipient an invitee; but this invitation need not be express, and the mere holding of the premises open will
be sufficient to imply an undertaking that due care has been exercised to
make the premises safe. In the instant case there was no holding out of
the car fender as having been made safe for riding.
58. Id. at 751-52. Some courts would probably disagree with this conclusion
on the ground that one does not have to select the means most suitable to aid
the occupier in order to be classified as an invitee.
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As a licensee, the court held, he was owed "no duty except to refrain from willfully injuring him or from committing negligence so
gross as to amount to willfulness."5 9 The Tennessee cases are in some
confusion regarding the duty of care owed a licensee. The rule stated
above is stated in several cases.60 It was at one time the majority
rule in this country, but "an increasing regard for human safety has
led to a retreat from this position, and the greater number of courts
now expressly reject it. '' 61 In Tennessee there are a number of cases
which follow the majority rule regarding an automobile guest (who
is classified as a licensee), and hold that ordinary care is required
in driving.62 The instant case can probably be reconciled with these
decisions by assuming that the court was holding as a matter of law
that there was no negligence to the plaintiff in the activity of driving
when the engine stalled and the truck rolled back. There was no
need to warn the plaintiff about the condition of the truck as this was
63
perfectly apparent to him.
Normally the duty to use care is not owed to an unknown trespasser.
4
Southern Ry. Co. v. Elliott6
reiterates again the Tennessee rule that
as a result of the Railroad Precautions Act a duty is owed by the
railroad to a person on the tracks.
The special Tennessee rule that a landlord is under a duty to use
care to discover and repair or warn of a defective condition of leased
premises was raised in Cart v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co.65
which involved land leased for strip mining. The court held that the
59. Id. at 750.
60. See, e.g., Chattanooga Whse. & Cold Storage Co. v. Anderson, 141 Tenn.

288, 210 S.W. 153 (1919); Westborne Coal Co. v. Willoughby, 133 Tenn. 257,
180 S.W. 322 (1915). But cf. Heaton v. Kagley, 198 Tenn. 530, 536, 281 S.W.2d

385, 388 (1955) ("He was a licensee under the law, and the only duty devolving upon the defendant was 'to use reasonable care to discover him and
avoid injury to him in carrying on activities upon the land' ").
61. PROSSER, TORTS 448 (2d ed. 1955). The duty owed is to use reasonable

care in conducting activities on the premises and to warn the licensee of
latent dangerous conditions which are known to the occupier; there is no duty
to use care to discover defective conditions. See generally, PROSSER, TORTS
§ 77 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER & JANEs, TORTS §§ 27.8-27.11 (1956).
62. E.g., Tennessee Central R.R. v. Vanhoy, 143 Tenn. 312, 226 S.W. 225
(1920); Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S.W.2d 828 (M.S. 1938);

Sandlin v. Komisar, 19 Tenn. App. 625, 93 S.W.2d 645 (M.S. 1936).
The case of Schenk v. Gwaltney, 309 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957)
decided during the Survey period indicates that the Tennessee rule is that
a driver owes a guest the duty of using ordinary care. The accident happened
in Indiana, however, and the Indiana Guest Statute was held to apply.
63. Harrison v. Graham, 21 Temi. App. 189, 107 S.W.2d 517 (M.S. 1957)
was another case involving falling off a fender and breaking a foot. A jury
verdict for plaintiff was affirmed. There are two possible distinguishing
features: (1) defendant was clearly negligent in starting the car while
plaintiff was still mounting the fender and (2) defendant "directed [plaintiff]
to get on the running board."
64. 250 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1958).
65. 153 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Tenn. 1957).
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existing underground entries could not be eliminated and that adequate notice was given.
66 an automobile dealer let a pros3. Suppliers: In Hill v. Harrill
pective customer have a second-hand automobile to try it out and
show it to his mother. The customer negligently ran into the plaintiff. It was held that the transaction was a bailment and that the
bailee's negligence is not imputed to the bailor. There being no
evidence of negligence on the part of the bailor in delivering the car
to the bailee, the court held that there should be a directed verdict
in his favor.

Benson v. Fowler67 treats the responsibility of a retail dealer (propane gas and equipment). It approved an instruction that the care
required "does not extend beyond the reasonable examination which
experience would indicate to the retail dealer is necessary, along with
the investigation of any unusual condition that might be apparent."
A jury verdict for defendant was affirmed.
4. ProfessionalNegligence: Two cases involved the negligence of a
notary public in taking an acknowledgment. In one he failed properly
to identify the person before him,6 8 and in the other he failed to
require the person to take an oath and swear though he did observe
the signing of the papers.6 9 In both cases the court appeared ready to
allow a finding of negligence but found that the negligence could
not be regarded as the proximate cause of the plaintiff's losses.
Garrison v. Graybeel70 involves a malpractice action against a
physician for negligence in administering antitoxin serum, but the
court merely held that a plea in abatement had been improperly sustained. The question was whether an employee could recover from
a physician employed by the employer after accepting workmen's
71
compensation from the employer.
5. Master and Servant: The case of Urmann v. City of Nashville72
involves an application of the fellow-servant rule. Plaintiff, a member

of a street crew, was injured when he fell off the rear of a truck on its
making a sudden turn without slowing down. The truck was given by
66. 310 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1957).
67. 306 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
68. Lowe v. Robin, 310 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1958). For an earlier decision in
this case, see Lowe v. Wright, 292 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
69. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Vaughn, 305 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1956).
70. 308 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1957), 25 TENN. L. Rav. 528 (1958).
71. See also, McMahon v. Baroness Erlanger Hospital, 306 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1957) where a student nurse negligently gave an obstetrical patient
ergotrate under the mistaken assumption that she had already been delivered.
The case turned on the issue of governmental immunity.
72. 311 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
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one Gilbert, the crew foreman, and the city defended on the ground
that Gilbert was a fellow servant. The court found that Gilbert was
"boss or foreman of the crew," in charge of it and not simply carrying out orders of his supervisors without discretion. As a result, he
was held to be a vice principal rather than a fellow servant, and a
judgment for defendant was reversed. A somewhat similar holding
seems to be implied in Garrisonv. Graybeel.73
The opinion in the Urmann case also contains an extensive discussion of the defense of assumption of risk. The conclusion was that
"even if the plaintiff assumed the ordinary risk of riding in the position in which he was found on the day of the accident; nevertheless,
it does not necessarily follow that he assumed the risk of negligent
driving such as the jury might have found from the evidence." 74
6. Governmental Agencies: A governmental agency is not liable for
negligence when it is performing a governmental function, as distinguished from a proprietary function. Thus the operation of a
hospital is regarded as a governmental function, and plaintiff was unable to recover in McMahon v. Baroness Erlanger Hospital75 where
the hospital was owned and operated by Hamilton County, even
though she was a paying patient and about 87 per cent of the hospital
income was received from paying patients. The court adverted to the
growing criticism of the rule of governmental immunity and the
growing trend away from it, but regarded the rule as solidly established in Tennessee. Under the Tennessee rule the immunity may be
waived by the procurement of liability insurance, but the insurance
held by the hospital in the McMahon case was held not to cover
malpractice and thus was ineffectual for the plaintiff.
76
On the other hand, in Wilson v. Maury County Board of Education,
involving a school bus, when the defendant admitted that it had liability insurance, the court held that it was proper for the trial judge to
exclude all reference to the insurance from the jury. The judge's
instruction that the defendant would be liable despite the fact that
it was engaged in a governmental function was held to be sufficient
for the jury.
73. 308 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1957), 25 TEN. L. REV. 528 (1958). Plaintiff had
been injured and was given an antitoxim serum injection by defendant, a
physician employed by plaintiff's employer. The court held that acceptance
of workmen's compensation from the employer did not prevent an action
against the physician and that a plea in abatement was improperly sustained.
In distinguishing an earlier case, it indicated that the physician was not to be
regarded as a fellow servant of the plaintiff, since "his services had no relation to the employer's business."
74. 311 S.W.2d at 626.
75. 306 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).

76. 302 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
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Thornton v. Carrier77 held that the legislature can by a private
act declare a proprietary act governmental and thus impose immunity.
The case involved construction of a harbor project.
Tennessee has held for some time that a municipality is liable for
the negligent maintenance of its streets and alleyways. 78 But the
statute requires that a written notice regarding the injury be given
the mayor within ninety days from the time it is received. 79 This ac8o
tion has been strictly construed, and the court held in Waite V. Orgill
that physical disability of the injured party did not excuse her from
giving proper notice.
OTHER TORTS
Battery: In Gross v. Abston,81 the court held that a private person is
not privileged to shoot and kill a fleeing misdemeanant. The decedent
had been peering in a bedroom window (a violation of the "Peeping
Tom Act"8 2) and was running away after being accosted by defendant
when defendant shot him. The case was reversed and sent back for a
new trial because the trial judge had failed to direct a verdict for
plaintiff.
Malicious Prosecution: In Rice v. Logan's Super Market83 defendants had a check for $25, purportedly signed by plaintiff; but
plaintiff disclaimed it, stating that it was not his signature and that
he did not know anything about it. Defendants swore out a warrant
for arrest against plaintiff, and it was apparently executed. When the
matter came before the grand jury, defendants advised it that the
check had been paid off and that they did not want to prosecute.
Plaintiff himself had never paid the check. The supreme court reversed the action of the trial judge in sustaining a demurrer to the
declaration, stating that the declaration contained the necessary elements of a cause of action in malicious prosecution, including lack
of probable cause, malice and termination of the criminal prosecution
favorably to plaintiff.
77. 311 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
78. For discussion of the basis of the rule, see Knoxville v. Fielding, 153
Tenn. 586, 285 S.W. 47 (1925).
79. TENw.CODE ANw. § 6-1003 (1955).
80. 310 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1958).
81. 311 S.W.2d 817 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
82. TENN. CODE AN. §39-1212 (1955).
83. 310 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1958).

